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I
INTRODUCTION

Professors McCubbins and Schwartz coined the term "fire alarm" when
arguing that Congress's apparent lack of effort in directly monitoring bureaucratic activity is not evidence of lack of control.1 Congress can rely on interest
groups and constituents to sound the alarm about agency misbehavior, and this
alone will deter some agency drift. Moreover, in establishing an agency's
administrative arrangements, Congress can lower the costs of agency access for
specific groups, enfranchising the interests it wants to help. Problems exist with
relying on fire alarms, however. Fire alarms are, by definition, groups affected
by the agency's decisions. Their reports about agency decisions are not
necessarily credible.
Professors Lupia and McCubbins address this credibility problem in their
model of the internal logic of fire alarms. They show that information about
agency decisions can come from multiple sources that may or may not be
credible. Sources may be credible for different reasons: because they take costly
actions; because they face penalties for lying (they have reputations to maintain);
or because their preferences are known to coincide with the principal's.2 Lupia
and McCubbins's model is quite general, illustrating the variety of ways that
institutional arrangements provide Congress with information about agency
decisions.
The authors make an important step toward modeling the design of
bureaucratic accountability. They show how the amount of usable information
Congress receives depends on institutional features, such as how difficult it is for
a potential fire alarm to sound the alarm. These institutional features are
decided by Congress in the course of legislating administrative arrangements. A
true model of bureaucratic design would imbed Lupia and McCubbins's model
of the informational consequences of bureaucratic institutions into a model of
congressional decisionmaking about those institutions. The existing model in its
general form may be too complex to be the second stage of a model of
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institutional choice. In particular, the information revealed depends on how the
ideal points of Congress, the agency, and the information sources are situated.
This comment discusses a simple sub-case of Lupia and McCubbins's general
model, corresponding to a particular configuration of ideal points. It is
somewhat different from the sub-case Lupia and McCubbins use to develop their
model. While the authors' sub-case is a good one for demonstrating the intuition
behind the model, the one discussed below may, for two reasons, be more
appropriate for addressing questions about designing regulatory agencies. First,
it is relatively simple. Second, it corresponds to the political environment
characteristic of regulatory policymaking.
II
GENERAL FRAMEWORK

The essential features of Lupia and McCubbins's general framework are as
follows. Policies are proposed by the agency and can be blocked by Congress.
Because of the agency's informational advantage, however, Congress does not
know the consequences of the agency's proposed policy. Interest groups can
make reports to Congress about the agency's proposal. Making a proposal or a
report may or may not be costly. Congress does not know the agency's ideal
point. Other actors may or may not know each others' preferences. It may or
may not be costly for interest groups to lie or to find out the consequences of the
agency's proposal.
To illustrate the general model, Lupia and McCubbins consider the following
sub-case. Congress wants policy to change in the opposite way from what the
agency wants. Interest Group One has the same preferences as Congress.
Group Two's ideal point is the status quo. Everybody knows the location of the
status quo. Congress does not know the preferences of the agency or of the
group that shares its preferences. Everyone knows that Group Two likes the
status quo best. Group TWo must exert costly effort to find out the consequences of the agency's offer; Group One finds out costlessly. The latter group pays
a penalty for lying to Congress about the agency's proposal.
The difference in costs faced by the two interest groups has a natural
interpretation as the difference between organized and unorganized interests.
The organized interest has enough expertise to understand the consequences of
the agency's proposal. Because it expects to have a stake in future policy
decisions, it suffers a penalty if it damages its reputation by lying. The
unorganized interest must invest in learning if it wants to understand the
agency's proposal, but it does not have a reputation to worry about.
III
WHOSE PREFERENCES ARE MoRE EXTREME?

This scenario with one organized and one relatively disorganized interest
group describes regulatory politics. The two information sources are the two
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groups affected by regulatory decisions: the beneficiaries and those who pay the
costs. These groups could represent organized producers and unorganized
consumers, polluters and those who suffer from pollution, or existing firms and
potential entrants. The characterization of the interest groups in Lupia and
McCubbins's sub-case is thus appropriate for thinking about the design of
regulatory agencies.
Consider the arrangement of ideal points, however. In Lupia and
McCubbins's sub-case, the support of the distribution from which the information
sources' ideal point are drawn lies between the ideal points of Congress and the
agency. However, if the two interest groups represent the winners and losers

from regulatory decisions, the ideal points of Congress and the agency will be
less extreme than those of the interest groups. Legislators' preferences derive
from the interests of constituents and support groups because of the desire to be
re-elected.3 Agency preferences similarly derive from external sources-the
preferences of elected officials and interest groups. 4 Because legislators
represent diverse constituencies and agencies face conflicting preferences, the
ideal points of Congress and the agency will almost always lie in between those
of the two fire alarms. An additional reason why Congress's ideal policy is
unlikely to be more extreme than the interest groups is that Congress is a group
of individuals whose collective decision reflects bargaining and compromise.
IV
BELIEFS ABOUT INTEREST GROUP PREFERENCES

If we continue to consider Congress's two outside sources of information to
be the potential winners and losers from regulatory decisions, we can narrow the
relevant sub-cases in terms of information structure as well as preference

configurations. As noted above, the first point is that interest group preferences
will generally be more extreme than an agency's or Congress's. The second
point is that if we know this, so does Congress. For this reason, sub-cases in
which Congress associates positive probability with the interest group having less
extreme preferences than itself are not often relevant to the accountability of
regulatory agencies.

In fact, Congress is less likely to be uncertain about interest group
preferences than about the status quo. Given that legislative preferences on a
policy dimension derive from how the policy affects interest groups and
constituents, legislators usually know the preferences of any group they care
about helping. On the other hand, if status quo is the outcome of current policy,
legislators may not know its precise location. For example, Congress is less
likely to be uncertain about the Sierra Club's or the National Coal Association's
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preference on the dimension of stringency of air quality standards than it is
about the precise consequences of current policy.
V
CONCLUSION

Lupia and McCubbins's model shows how Congress can gain information
about agency decisions from outside sources of information. The amount of
information transmitted depends not only on institutional parameters, such as the
costs of making proposals and reports, but also on the configuration of ideal
points. For this reason, the model's predictions about how Congress tries to
design bureaucratic accountability will only be as good as the assumptions about
the preferences of the players. The most promising configurations of preferences
for Lupia and McCubbins to consider are those in which the ideal points of
Congress and the agency are known to lie between those of the fire alarms.

